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DUTY TO COOPERATE UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE
SHERMAN ACT: ASPEN SKIING 'S SLIPPERY SLOPE
A monopolist is under no general duty to help its rivals survive
in the market.' In 1985, however, the Supreme Court ruled in Aspen
Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.2 that a monopolist's refusal
to do business with a competitor sometimes may constitute monop-
olization in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.3 Aspen Skiing,
the Court's first elaborate discussion of monopolization in nearly
two decades,4 is significant for two reasons. First, the opinion rees-
tablishes a jury's competence to infer anticompetitive intent in mo-
nopolization cases. Second, the opinion expressly recognizes the
importance of efficiency concerns in section 2 analysis.
This Note begins by discussing the self-correcting monopoly
phenomenon and exclusionary practices. This Note then discusses
evolving standards in the conduct element of monopolization. After
considering the Aspen Skiing conduct test, this Note questions
whether the circumstances relied upon by the Court can contribute
to meaningful differentiations between aggressive competition and
illegal exclusion. Finally, this Note argues that the Court disre-
garded the inherent difficulties in requiring cooperation among
competitors and failed to articulate clearly the evidentiary require-
ments for a section 2 violation when a monopolist refuses to cooper-
ate. This Note concludes that courts should construe Aspen Skiing's
holding narrowly: a monopolist's decision to extricate itself from a
profitable joint venture can give rise to section 2 liability when the
joint venture is demonstrably more efficient than its break-up, the
monopolist lacks any legitimate business justification for its con-
duct, and barriers preclude entry into the relevant market.
I 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTrrUIST LAW 738m (1978).
2 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
'1 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides in relevant part:
"'Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize ... any part of the trade
or commerce among the several stales . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony .. "
Section 6 of the Clayton Antitrust Act provides private parties the right to seek injunc-
tive relief for antitrust violations. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982).
For discussions of legislative history and the e% oving judicial interpretation of sec-
tion 2, see W. LETWIN, LAW ANi) ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: "IIE EVoI.UyTION OF TIHE
SHERMAN ANTirI-RUST Ac-.I (1965); H. TInoRm.I., TIIE FEDERAI. ANTrrRUST PoLICY: ORlGI-
NATION OF AN AMERICAN "RADITION (1955). Compare R. BORK, TIE ANTITRtST P.RADOX:
A PoI.C" xr WAR WITh ITSFI.F 15-89 (1978).
4 The last significant discussion appeared in United States v. Grinnell Corp.. 384
U.S. 563 (1966).
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I
THE ECONOMICS OF MONOPOLY AND EXCLUSIONARY
PRACTICES
Section 2 of the Sherman Act seeks to redress undesirable eco-
nomic and political consequences flowing from market dominance.
In seeking to enforce section 2, however, the following dilemma has
plagued courts: How should antitrust law respond to a business that
legitimately prevails in a competitive struggle and achieves a domi-
nant market position? The answer lies in identifying those features
and consequences of market dominance that should be corrected or
avoided. To do that, one first must understand the economic forces
underlying the monopoly problem. 5
A. The Self-Correcting Monopoly Problem
In general, higher prices exist in monopolistic markets than in
perfectly competitive markets. Monopolies also tend to lower out-
put, stifle innovation, and transfer wealth from consumers to produ-
cers. 6  In theory, these undesirable consequences are self-
correcting.7 High profits or profitable new opportunities encourage
entry into the monopolist's market or induce existing competitors to
increase output. Consequently, the monopolist lacks incentive to
raise prices by lowering output.8 The market will not self-correct,
however, in two instances, yielding persistent single firm domi-
nance. In the first instance, the dominant firm's greater efficiency
and innovation permits it to drive out all its rivals. 9 Here, the mar-
ket needs no correcting. In the second instance, barriers to entry,' 0
such as legal licenses or controls over essential resources, prevent
entry into the market. The market needs correcting, yet it cannot
self-correct; the law should thus provide a remedy.
B. Exclusionary Practices
The market's self-correcting nature is anathema to a monopo-
list hoping to preserve its market position, thereby reaping its at-
tendant rewards. A monopolist may respond strategically to the
5 For a discussion of the costs of monopoly, see, e.g., F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 9-44 (2d ed. 1980).
6 R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 9.3, at 254-59, § 7.1, at 201-05 (3d ed.
1986).
7 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 1, 618, at 41-42.
8 Id. 618, at 41.
9 Id. 618, at 41.
I0 A barrier to entry is some factor in the market that makes operation more expen-
sive for new entrants than it is for existing firms. See Demsetz, Ban'iers to Entr', 72 AM.
ECON. REv. 47 (1982). Thus, to the extent entry barriers exist, a monopolist may suc-
ceed in charging monopoly prices without incurring new entry.
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threat of increased competition by implementing price or output
schemes designed to deter entry or eliminate smaller existing
rivals. 1'
Section 2 proscribes strategic maneuvers that interfere with the
normal competitive process and artificially deter entry or prevent
existing rivals from increasing their output. Judges and scholars use
the term "exclusionary" as a shorthand for such conduct. 12 But, as
reflected in judicial opinions, not all practices that exclude competi-
tors are "exclusionary." For this reason, one must distinguish con-
duct that increases the firm's market share because of efficiencies or
the rigors of competition from improper conduct that deters entry
or eliminates smaller rivals. Efficient conduct may benefit consum-
ers by improving the product or lowering the product's price.1 3 Im-
proper exclusionary practices, on the other hand, stifle effective
competition and reduce consumer welfare.1 4 Section 2 functions
best when courts clearly distinguish between exclusionary practices
that actually promote efficiency and those practices deserving con-
demnation. Far from condemnation, these former practices should
be tolerated, if not encouraged-even if they harm competitors.
C. Refusals-to-Deal
A refusal-to-deal is a strategic business practice that firms some-
times use to exclude existing or potential competitors. A competi-
tive market firm's refusal-to-deal has little market effect, but a
monopolist's refusal-to-deal may create an undesirable restraint on
competition.' 5 In competitive markets, no firm is large enough to
control output or price and therefore each firm lacks the incentive to
refuse to deal in the hope of restricting output and raising prices.
Moreover, the competitive market penalizes arbitrary refusals-to-
deal because the rejected party can deal with a multitude of other
firms. Thus, a refusal-to-deal is less likely to occur in competitive
markets. A rational firm will decide not to deal only for sound busi-
ness reasons.' 6 For example, a rational manufacturer in a competi-
tive market would refuse to deal with a distributor only if dealing
11 H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 1.2, at 18 (1985).
12 See P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 1, 626b.
13 H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 11. at 138.
14 Id.
15 See Banana Distribs., Inc. v. United Fruit Co., 162 F. Supp. 32, 37 (S.D.N.Y.
1958), rev'd, 269 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1959) (contrasting refusal-to-deal in competitive mar-
ket, which is self-correcting, and anticompetitive refusal-to-deal by a monopolist, which
is not, therefore requiring remedy by antitrust law); see also Note, The Monopolist's Refusal
to DeaL An Argument for a Rule of Reason, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1107, 1112-13 (1981).
16 See, e.g., Blair Foods, Inc. v. Ranchers Cotton Oil, 610 F.2d 665, 670 (9th Cir.
1980) (although defendants' conduct far from congenial, mere intention to exclude
competition insufficient to establish violation of Sherman Act.).
1987] 1049
CORNELL LA IF REVIEVo2
with alternative distributors would result in lower costs or a better
product or service. In those situations, the refusal-to-deal actually
contributes to market efficiency by increasing output or demand.' 7
A monopolist's refusal-to-deal, however, may result in serious
anticompetitive effects. The presence of one dominant firm able to
lower output and raise price characterizes a monopolistic market.'
A monopolist can lower output and cause a price increase by refus-
ing to deal with a firm or group of firms. In a monopolistic market,
refusals-to-deal harm firms because of the absence of parties with
whom to deal. Firms must then seek their next best alternative.' 9
Interference with the victim's freedom of choice prevents the effi-
cient operation of a competitive market, which operates on the prin-
ciple that people are best off when they voluntarily exchange goods
and services. 20 Because the monopolistic market lacks a built-in
mechanism to prevent interference with freedom of choice and to
protect victims of refusals-to-deal, the law provides a remedy.2 1
When analyzing a lawful monopolist's refusal-to-deal, courts
should clearly distinguish refusals-to-deal that promote efficiency
from refusals-to-deal that impede competition and lack business jus-
tifications. The effect on output or demand should provide the basis
for differentiation. If a refusal-to-deal causes an increase in output,
the conduct generally should not be condemned. The competitive
process as a whole, not merely harm to competitors, should serve as
the focus of this inquiry. In this proposed test, intent should play a
small role. Courts should require proof of intent only in cases
17 See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 11, § 10.4.
Is Id. § 1.2, at 14-17.
I' Id. at 38.
20 See E. MANSFIELD, MONOPOLY POWER AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE vii (3d ed.
1974).
21 In view of the inefficiencies associated with a monopolist's refusal-to-deal, some
commentators have suggested that antitrust law should impose on monopolies a duty to
deal with all comers on a nondiscriminatory basis. This duty would resemble that al-
ready imposed on public utilities. See. e.g., Jones. .. ntitrust and Specific Economic Regulation:
An Inirodurtion to Comparative Analysis, 19 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECrION 261, 267-68 (1961)
(restrictions applicable to regulated monopolists should be, and have been, imposed
upon unregulated natural monopolies; these restrictions include forbidding monopolies
from arbitrarily refusing to deal, from discriminating unduly, or from engaging in unrea-
sonable practices).
Two broad and related theoretical foundations, however, militate against imposing
upon monopolists a general "duty to deal." The first is ehiciency. "he Supreme Court
has acknowledged that efficient competition demands that a business entity exercise
flreedom of choice over its distribution patterns. Continental FV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54-55 (1977). A firm needs freedom to increase its efficiencv b sub-
stituting what it believes are more productive methods of supply and distribution. The
second theoretical foundation derives firom "free market" ideology. See R. BORK, Supra
note 3, at 344. "Free market" implies freedom of choice over one's distribution patterns
and protection of that freedom absent anticompetitive intent.
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where competitive impact is uncertain. 22
II
JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICES
UNDER SECTION 2
Nearly a century after enactment, section 2 of the Sherman Act
remains among the most perplexing of the antitrust laws. To violate
section 2, an entity must, at a minimum, possess monopoly power.
Courts have defined monopoly power as the power to control prices
or exclude competitors from the relevant market.23 In addition,
monopolization includes a conduct component (arguably embracing
an element of intent).
A. Development of the Conduct Element of Monopolization
Confusion surrounds judicial attempts to enumerate those busi-
ness practices that violate section 2. Three historical approaches,
exhibiting varying degrees of hostility toward monopolists, have
emerged as formulations of the conduct element of monopoliza-
tion. 2' Under the first and narrowest approach, 25 monopolization
entails the acquisition or maintenance of a power to exclude others
as a result of using any unreasonable restraint of trade that would
violate section 1 of the Sherman Act.215 In United States v. American
Tobacco Co., Chief Justice White suggested that conduct that would
violate section 1 if engaged in by two parties would also violate sec-
tion 2 if unilaterally performed by a firm possessing monopoly
power.2 7
Justice Douglas developed a second, "more inclusive ap-
proach" in United States v. Griffith.28 Under the Griffith rule, a firm
violates section 2 when it (a) has the power to exclude competition,
and (b) has exercised, or has the purpose to exercise, it.29 In United
States v. United Shoe AMacineiy Coip., Judge Wyzanski interpreted the
22 See i'fra text accompanying notes 119-20.
23 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956) ("Mo-
nopoly power is the power to control prices or exclude competition."); Ball Mcmorial
Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. his., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1335 (7th Cir. 1986) (monopoly
power is power to raise prices without losing so nmch business that price increase is
unprofitable).
24 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., I 10 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953)
(Wyzanski, J.), iff'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
25 This approach was seen as the rule belbre United States v. Aluminum Co. of
Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); see infra notes 3 1-33 and accompanying text.
26 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) (providing in relevant part that every contract, combination
or conspiracy in restraint of* trade is illegal).
27 221 U.S. 106, 180-81 (1911).
28 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
2) Id. at 107.
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Griffith rule to mean, at a minimum, that "it is a violation of Section 2
for one having effective control of the market to use, or plan to use,
any exclusionary practice, even though it is not a technical restraint of
trade." 30
The third and broadest approach was set forth by Judge
Learned Hand in United States v. Aluminum Co. ofAmerica.31 The Alcoa
rule condemns "one who has acquired an overwhelming share of
the market ... whenever he does business . . . apparently even if
there is no showing that his business involves any exclusionary prac-
tice." 32 Under the Alcoa rule a defendant could escape liability only
by proving that its dominant position was due solely to:
superior skill, superior products, natural advantages, (including
accessibility to raw materials or markets), economic or technologi-
cal efficiency, (including scientific research), low margins of profit
maintained permanently and without discrimination, or licenses
conferred by, and used within, the limits of law, (including patents
on one's own inventions, or franchises granted directly to the en-
terprise by a public authority).33
In 1966 the Supreme Court in United States v. Grinnell Corp.34
articulated a rule closely resembling the second approach. Under
Grinnell, monopolization entails (1) monopoly power and (2) "the
willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished
from growth or development as a consequence of a superior prod-
uct, business acumen, or historic accident." 35 Grinnell thus draws a
distinction between "willful acquisition or maintenance" and domi-
nance achieved through superior skill. Today, the Grinnell rule
predominates.
Recent appellate court decisions endorsing vigorous competi-
tion by monopolists3 6 ignore intent, however, signaling a partial
30 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass. 1953), aft'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (emphasis
added). Under this approach, courts could deem conduct exclusionary even if the con-
duct would not violate section 1 if performed by two or more parties, e.g., price fixing or
tie-ins.
3' 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The unique procedural posture of this case lent
itself to unusual precedential value. The Second Circuit decided this case under 15
U.S.C. § 29 (amended 1944) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (1976)), which pro-
vided that in antitrust cases brought by the Department ofJustice, when a quorum of six
Supreme Court Justices could not be obtained because of disqualification, the case was
to be certified to the circuit court in the district in which the case was brought and heard
by the three senior judges, whose decision would be final and not be reviewable by
appeal, certiorari or otherwise. The Supreme Court endorsed the Alcoa decision the
following year in American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811-14 (1946).
32 United Shoe, 110 F. Supp. at 342 (citing Alcoa).
33 Id.
34 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
35 id. at 570-71.
36 E.g., California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir.
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erosion of Grinnell's willful conduct standard.3 7 These decisions
employ strict objective tests of challenged business practices to de-
tect unlawful conduct. Under this trend, practices reflecting rational
business decisions, such as pricing above costs or introducing a
product or service improvement, will not constitute illegal conduct
under section 2. If a given practice reflects rational business con-
duct, a court will not inquire into the monopolist's intent.
For example, the Tenth Circuit in Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp. 38 re-
versed a monopolization judgment against IBM, concluding that the
district court's approach, closely following that in Grinnell, was erro-
neous. The Tenth Circuit stated that the district court had failed to
consider whether IBM's acts were ordinary practices available to all
in the market and whether IBM's conduct amounted to an improper
"use" of its monopoly power.39
Similarly, in California Computer Products, Inc. v. IBM Corp.
(Calcomp) 40 the Ninth Circuit held that IBM's price reduction and
design changes did not violate section 2. The Ninth Circuit decided
that a monopolist may rightfully respond to its rivals' lower prices
with reduced, but still above cost, prices of its own.4 1 Further, the
court ruled that monopolists may redesign their products to in-
crease performance or decrease cost. The court noted that because
a monopolist has no duty to help its competitors survive or expand,
IBM need not disclose information on its new products prior to
their introduction. 42 The Ninth Circuit ultimately held that IBM es-
caped liability because its practices did not unnecessarily exclude or
restrict competition.
Finally, in Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.43 plaintiff Ber-
key Photo claimed that Kodak's introduction of a 110 camera sys-
tem, a new pocket camera and complementary film and
photofinishing process, violated section 2 of the Sherman Act. The
Second Circuit ruled that introduction of a new camera with im-
proved film was a "superior product"44 that could not be consid-
1979); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. de-
ied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975). See also Comment, Drainig the Alcoa "'1'ishing 1'll':- The
Section 2 Conduct Requh'ement after Kodak anid Calcomp, 48 FORDIIAM L. RE:V. 291 (1979).
37 See Note, The Conduct Standard for Legally A-cqntired .lonopolies Under Section 2 of the
Shermian Atl, 49 U. CIN. L. Rzv. 206. 222 (1980).
38 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
'19 I. at 925-26. For more elaborate discussions of TeeI, see Note, Innovation Gon,-
petition: Beyond'Telex v. IBM, 28 STAN. L. REv. 285 (1976); Note, Telex v. IBM: .lonopoly
Pricing Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 84 YALE L.J. 558 (1975).
40 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979).
41 Id. at 741-42.
42 Id, at 744.
43 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
44 603 F.2d at 285-86.
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ered exclusionary. The court agreed with Berkey Photo that
Kodak's introduction of the 110 system sought to combine its power
in the camera and film markets to bolster stagnating camera sales.
The court held, however, that Kodak was not liable because none of
its acts unreasonably restricted competition; they merely reflected
"the process of invention and innovation." 45 Significantly, the Sec-
ond Circuit expressly rejected its earlier Alcoa approach.46
B. Refusal-to-Deal as an Exclusionary Practice 47
Generally firms in competitive and monopolistic markets freely
choose with whom they will deal. Nonetheless, courts have imposed
a duty to deal upon monopolists in two lines of cases. First, firms
may not refuse to deal where they seek to create or maintain a mo-
nopoly.48 Second, a business or group of businesses controlling an
"essential facility" has a duty to provide reasonable access to
competitors. 49
The first line of cases, designated as the "intent" theory of lia-
bility, derives from the free-trader principle articulated in United
States v. Colgate & Co.50 In Colgate the Supreme Court declared in
45 Id. at 281.
46 Id. at 273-74.
47 For extensive treatments of refusals-to-deal by monopolists, see Adams, Antitrust
Constraints on Single-Firm Refusals to Deal by Monopolists in the European Economic Comminzity
and the United States, 20 TEX. INT' L.J. 1 (1985); Note, Refusals to Deal by Vertically Integ'ated
Monopolists, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1721 (1974); Note, Vertical Refusals to Deal Under the Sherman
Act: Products LiabilitY and Malley Duff Divide the Circuits, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1355 (1985).
48 See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 380 (1973) (private
utility company with monopoly power in wholesale power market illegally "sought to
substitute for competition anticompetitive uses of its dominant economic power"); Lo-
rain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (monopoly newspaper's refusal to
sell advertising to customers who bought advertising from local radio station was
designed to destroy competitor and therefore enjoined as illegal attempt to monopo-
lize); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927) (Ko-
dak's refusal to sell supplies to distributor after acquiring control of competing
distributor, and after unsuccessfully attempting to purchase plaintiff's business, sup-
ported inference of monopolistic intent which was basis of jury finding of illegal
monopolization).
4,) See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (bylaws allowing
existing members to restrict nembership of competitors struck down as unreasonable
restraint of competition); Woods Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438
F.2d 1286, 1303-09 (5th Cir. 1971) (defendants hindered plaintiff from extracting natu-
ral gas from field by refusing access to transport facilities, pooling arrangements, or
right-of-way), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Pro-
duce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir.) (local produce wholesalers who jointly owned
building with unique access to rail flacilities may not refuse access to out-of-state distrib-
utor if valid business reason such as lack of space or financial unsoundness is absent),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952).
5o 250 U.S. 300 (1919) (holding lawful defendant's refusal to continue selling to
dealers who did not abide by seller's suggested retail prices).
1054 Vol. 72:1047
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dictum that has since become axiomatic:5'
In the absence of any propose to create or maintain a monopoly, the [Sher-
man A]ct does not restrict the long recognized right of a trader or
manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to ex-
ercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he
will deal.5
2
The Colgate free-trader rule implies an important exception to the
presumption of free trade. A business cannot refuse to deal with
whomever it pleases when a "purpose to create or maintain a mo-
nopoly" motivates that refusal. 53
In LorainJournal Co. v. United States54 the Supreme Court applied
the exception to the Colgate free-trader rule. The newspaper con-
tended that Colgate's free-trader principle sanctioned its refusal to
deal with advertisers who also purchased advertising from a local
radio station. The Supreme Court disagreed, however, holding that
the Journal's refusal to deal fell squarely within Colgate's "purpose
to create or maintain a monopoly" exception because the refusal
sought to eliminate a local radio station as a competitor in the ad-
vertising market. -5
The second line of cases imposing a duty to deal upon monopo-
lists sets forth the "essential facilities" or "bottleneck" theory of
monopolization.5 6 A duty to deal under the "essential facilities"
theory applies where a business or group of businesses controls a
unique facility, access to which is necessary for rivals to compete. In
the seminal "essential facilities" case, United States v. Terminal Rail-
road Association,57 the Supreme Court held that a group of railroad
companies that owned the only terminal in St. Louis capable of ac-
commodating traffic from the West had to provide access to all com-
peting railroads on reasonable terms. 58 The Court reasoned that
51 Courts still faithfully adhere to the Colgate free-trader principle. See Monsanto
Co. v. Spray-Rite Ser'. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984) (citing Colgate and reaflirning its
holding); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429,438-39 (1980); Official Airline Guides, Inc.
v. I'TC, 630 F.2d 920, 927-28 (2d Cir. 1980), rert. denied, 450 U.S. 917 (1981).
52 250 U.S. at 307 (emphasis added).
5:3 The scope of the "purpose to create or maintain a monopoly" exception is un-
resolved. A strict reading of the Colgale rule indicates that refisals to deal are unlawful
only when used to create or maintain a monopoly, not if used to exploit a monopoly
position. See Adams, supra note 47, at 7-8. Prolessors Areeda and lTurner argue for an
even more restrictive construction. See 3 P. AREE.X. & D. "IURNER, supra note I. ! 7291) &
n.4, at 235. A monopolist, of course, may only refluse to deal if he acts unilaterally.
Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307.
54 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
55 Id. at 155.
56 For a comprehensive discussion of the "essential fhcilities" doctrine, see Note,
Unclogging the Boltleneck: .4 A'ez Es.eniial Facility Doctrine. 83 Coi.uM. L. R. 441 (1983).
57 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
58 Id. at 411-12.
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compelling the owners to provide services to all railroads on equal
terms prevented exclusive ownership of vital facilities from imped-
ing commerce.5-'
One distinction between the "intent" theory and the "essential
facilities" theory is that the former focuses on the monopolist's
motivations behind a refusal-to-deal and the latter primarily scruti-
nizes the refusal's effect on victimized rivals. 60 In practice, both the-
ories often appear in a court's analysis in a single case, as
demonstrated by the Supreme Court's opinion in Otter Tail Power Co.
v. U ited States.61 In Otter Tail the government brought a civil anti-
trust action against Otter Tail Power Company, an electric utility,
for attempting to monopolize the retail distribution of electric
power in its service area. The Court held that Otter Tail used its
monopoly position as the exclusive regional supplier of wholesale
power to "foreclose competition or gain a competitive advantage, or
to destroy a competitor" 62 in the retail power market, all in violation
of section 2. Otter Tail's conduct was blatantly exclusionary: it re-
fused to deal with proposed municipal power systems needing ac-
cess to backup wholesale electricity only Otter Tail could supply; it
denied proposed power companies access to its power lines, render-
ing them unable to obtain power from other suppliers; it invoked
restrictive contract clauses for the same purpose; and it engaged in a
pattern of harassing litigation against the potential entrants
designed to "delay and prevent" the establishment of municipal
electrical systems. 63 In noting that monopolist motives and a desire
to withhold essential facilities underlay Otter Tail's conduct, the
Supreme Court incorporated both theories into its brief analysis. 64
Relying on Otter Tail, the Sixth Circuit in Byars v. Bluff City News
Co. (;5 abandoned the traditional approach of separately treating in-
tent and essential facilities. Instead, the Sixth Circuit focused on the
overall impact of the monopolist's practices. In Byars a periodicals
supplier terminated his relationship with his lone distributor, 66 ex-
5s) Id.
(3( See Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 856 (6th Cir. 1979).
61 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
62 Id. at 377.
63- Id. at 368.
(4 The Court rejected Otter Tail's only proffered business justification-self-pres-
ervation-because the " 'promotion of self-interest alone does not.. . immunize other-
wise illegal conduct.'" Id. at 380 (quoting United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388
U.S. 365, 375 (1967)). The Court did not declare that self-preservation was an invalid
justification. Rather, the Court merely accepted the lower court's conclusion that Otter
Tail's fears were greatly exaggerated. See United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 331 F.
Supp. 54, 64 (D. Minn. 1971), aff d in part, revd in part, 417 U.S. 901 (1974).
(15 609 F.2d 843 (6th Cir. 1979).
66 The distributor serviced small retail outlets that the supplier had directly ser-
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tending the supplier's monopoly in the supply market to the local
market for periodicals distribution. In remanding the case for fur-
ther findings, the Sixth Circuit proposed a framework for analyzing
a lawful monopolist's refusal-to-deal. The Sixth Circuit instructed
the district court to focus on the overall impact of the monopolist's
practices, requiring a thorough analysis of each fact situation.t 7
Under this test a court must balance the damage to competition
against the monopolist's business and efficiency justifications and
deem a practice exclusionary only if it is "unreasonably
anticompetitive." 68
The Byars court justified its consideration of a monopolist's
business justification by reasoning that because the law tolerates the
existence of some monopolists, courts must give monopolists some
leeway in making business decisions. 69 Moreover, the technical jus-
tification for such a defense is that a valid business purpose can off-
set a finding of monopolistic intent. 70
III
ASPEN SKIING Co. v. ASPEN HIGHLANDS SKIING CORP.
A. The Facts
Aspen, Colorado is a destination ski resort7 boasting superior
ski facilities and first-rate entertainment. Prior to 1964 three in-
dependent companies, including Aspen Skiing Co. (Ski Co.) and
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. (Highlands), operated three major
viced, but then had abandoned because their volume was insufficient to justify the serv-
icing costs. Id. at 846.
67 Id. at 860.
68 Id. If the subcontractor could establish anticompetitive injury resulting from the
distributor's acts, the distributor could still escape condemnation by presenting business
reasons justifying its conduct. Id. at 862-63.
69 Id. at 862 (citing Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701,
711-13 (7th Cir. 1977) (lawfulness of monopolist's termination of relationship with
dealer depends upon monopolist's purpose), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1979); Interna-
tional Rys. of Cent. Am. v. United Brands Co., 532 F.2d 231, 239-40 (2d Cir.) (defend-
ant's refusal to deal was proper because it "had no reasonable business ,lternative but
to abandon an unprofitable and uncomfortable operation"), cer. denied, 429 U.S. 835
(1976)).
70 Id. at 862 & n.53 (citing Six Twenty-Nine Prods., Inc. v. Rollins Telecasting, Inc..
365 F.2d 478,486 (5th Cir. 1966)); see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Mater-
ials Co., 295 F. 98 (5th Cir. 1923), aff'd, 273 U.S. 359 (1927). See generally Times-Pica-
yune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); United States v. Columbia
Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
71 Destination resorts differ from day resorts in that vacationers visit the former
expecting to spend at least several days at the resort, and the latter caters to patrons who
normally drive in, use the facilities, and leave the same day. Destination resorts feature,
in addition to skiing slopes, lodges, restaurants, and entertainment. See Aspen Skiing
Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605-06 n.34 (1985).
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ski facilities in the Aspen area.72 Each operator offered its lift tickets
for daily use at its own facility and an interchangeable six-day, all-
Aspen ticket. 73 Ski Co., which acquired its second of the three origi-
nal facilities in 1964 and opened a fourth in 1967, also offered a
weekly, multi-area ticket covering only its facilities. 74 Practical con-
siderations and regulatory obstacles make the development of any
more major ski facilities in Aspen infeasible. 75
Ski Co. terminated the joint ticket in 1978 after Highlands re-
jected Ski Co.'s demand that Highlands accept a fixed share of reve-
nues7li far below Highlands's historical average, which was based on
actual usage. 77 Ski Co. continued to offer a six-day pass good only
for its three facilities. Ski Co. promoted its six-day package with a
national advertising campaign that strongly suggested that it offered
the only ski facilities in Aspen. 78
As an alternative to Ski Co.'s three-area ticket, Highlands
sought to offer its own multi-area package by combining High-
lands's lift tickets with those it hoped to purchase directly from Ski
Co. Ski Co., however, refused to sell any tickets to Highlands,
either at the tour operator's discount or at retail. 7'9 When High-
72 Id. at 587.
73 Id. The Colorado Attorney General had challenged the legality of the all-Aspen
ticket in 1975 when he filed a complaint against the participating parties charging that
the joint marketing arrangement violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The
Attorney General alleged that the negotiations over the four-area ticket provided the
parties with a forum for price fixing in violation of section 1 and that the joint ticket was
a mechanism by which they attempted to monopolize the market for downhill skiing
services in Aspen in violation of section 2. In 1977, the case was settled in a consent
decree permitting the parties to continue offering the joint ticket provided that they set
their own prices unilaterally before negotiating its terms. Id. at 591 n.9.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 588.
76 During the lifetime of the all-Aspen ticket, the issuers experimented with various
methods of distributing revenues. Initially the joint package consisted of booklets con-
taining six coupons. each redeemable for a daily lift ticket at any, of the three original
mountains. Revenues fi'om the sale of the coupon books were distributed in accordance
with the number of coupons collected at each mountain. Id. at 589. When an "around
the neck" ticket replaced the coupon book, lift operators at Highlands monitored its
usage. Officials from Ski Co. and Highlands periodically met to review the figures re-
corded at Highlands, and to distribute revenues based on that count. Id. at 590. Later.
random sample surveys were implemented when the parties expressed concern that a
more scientific method of monitoring was necessary. The parties allocated revenues
based on these surveys. Id. at 590-91.
77 Highlands had controlled as much as 20.5% of the Aspen downhill skiing mar-
ket. Yet, Ski Co. insisted that Highlands accept a 13.2% lixed share of the ticket reve-
nues for the 1977-78 season. Highlands acceded to Ski Co.'s demand. but only because
it feared the elimination of the joint ticket, and because it hoped to persuade Ski Co. to
return to the division of revenues based on usage. This was not to be. The following
season, Ski Co. demanded that Highlands accept a 12.4%/ fixed share. Highlands re-
Jected this demand. Id. at 592.
78 Id. at 593.
79 Id.
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lands developed its "Adventure Pack," consisting of a three-day
pass at Highlands and three vouchers-each equal to the price of a
daily lift ticket at a Ski Co. mountain 8 -- Ski Co. refused to accept
the vouchers.8 ' In a final bid to salvage a multi-area ticket, High-
lands replaced the coupons with travelers checks. But Ski Co.
thwarted this attempt by raising its prices for a single-day lift ticket,
making Highlands's package prohibitively expensive.8 2
B. The Lower Courts Find a Duty to Cooperate
Highlands filed a complaint against Ski Co. claiming that Ski
Co. had monopolized the market for downhill skiing services in
Aspen in violation of section 2.83 Following United States v. Grinnell
Corp.,84 the district court judge instructed the jury that the offense
entailed "(1) possession of monopoly power in the relevant market,
and (2) the willful acquisition, maintenance, or use of that power by
anticompetitive or exclusionary means or for anticompetitive or ex-
clusionary purposes."'8 5 The jury determined that the relevant
product market was "downhill skiing at destination ski resorts," that
the relevant geographic submarket was the "Aspen area," and that
Ski Co. possessed monopoly power, defined as the power to set
prices in, or to exclude competitors from, the relevant market.86
The jury instruction on the conduct element of monopoliza-
tion-willful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power-
stressed the importance of the monopolist's motive. The trial judge
instructed the jury that mere possession of monopoly power does
not give rise to a duty to cooperate with business rivals, and that
possession of monopoly power coupled with a refusal to enter into a
joint marketing arrangement with a competitor does not compel a
finding of monopolization "if valid business reasons exist for that re-
fusal."8 7 The jury found both elements of monopolization as de-
80 The vouchers were backed up by funds deposited in a local bank, and redeem-
able at full value by Aspen merchants. Id. at 594.
81 Id. Ski Co. justified its position of not even selling tickets at retail to Highlands
by stating, "[We will not support our competition." Id. at 594 n.14.
82 Id. at 594 n.15. Ski Co. also discounted the price of'its three-area, six-day ticket.
Id.
83 Id. at 595. Highlands filed its complaint in the United States District Court for
the District of Colorado.
84 384 U.S. 563 (1966); see supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
85 472 U.S. at 595-96.
86 Id. at 596 n.20.
87 Id. (emphasis added). The judge elaborated:
In other words, if there were legitimate business reasons for the re-
fusal, then the defendant, even if he is found to possess monopoly power
in a relevant market, has not violated the law. We are concerned with
conduct which unnecessarily excludes or handicaps competitors. ...
... [Y]ou must determine whether [Ski Co.] gained, maintained, or
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fined in these instructions and the district court entered a judgment
awarding Highlands treble damages of $7,500,000.88
The Tenth Circuit affirmed."! ' The court relied on both the "in-
tent" theory and the "essential facilities" theory in rejecting Ski
Co.'s argument that " 'there was insufficient evidence to present a
jury issue of monopolization because, as a matter of law, the con-
duct was pro-competitive.' ",.0 First, the court determined that a
jury could have characterized the all-Aspen ticket as an essential fa-
cility that Ski Co. had a duty to market jointly with Highlands.!'"
Second, the court found that there was sufficient evidence to sup-
port the jury's finding that Ski Co., in terminating the all-Aspen
ticket, "together with its other conduct," intended to create or
maintain a monopoly.92
C. The Supreme Court Qualifies the Duty
Before the Supreme Court, Ski Co. did not challenge the dis-
trict court judge's instructions to the jury. Rather, Ski Co. claimed
that the jury's finding of willful maintenance was erroneous as a
matter of law because it rested on an assumption that a firm with
monopoly power has a duty tinder section 2 of the Sherman Act to
cooperate with its smaller rival.93 Justice Stevens, writing for a
unanimous eight-justice Court,- 4 rejected this contention.95 In-
deed, the trial judge had unambiguously instructed the jury that
even a firm possessing monopoly power has no duty to cooperate
with its competitors.!", Justice Stevens noted that the absence of an
unqualified duty to cooperate is "merely the counterpart of the in-
dependent businessman's cherished right" to select business associ-
ates.97  Citing United States v. Colgate & Co.," ' Justice Stevens
usCd monopoly power in a relevant market by arrangements and policies
which rather than being a consequence of a superior product, superior
business sense, or historic element, were designedpiriiarily tofir/her any dom-
ination of the relevanti market or sub-markel.
Id. at 597 (quoting trial judge's instruction) (emphasis added).
88 1(. at 598. The District Court also entered an injunction ordering the parties to
market jointly a six-day, nimiltifacility coupon booklet "substantially idcntical to" the
-booklet offered by Ski Co. at another of its ski resorts in Colorado. Id. at 598 n.23.
89 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 738 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir.
1984), ff d, 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
9o Id. at 1516-17 (quoting Brief of l)endant-Appellant. Cross-Apellee. at 40, id.
(Nos. 82-1407, 82-1424)).
9' Id. at 1521.
92 Id. at 1521-22.
93 Brief of 'Petitioner at 15, Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472
U.S. 585 (1985) (No. 84-510).
94 Justice White did not particil)ate in the decision. 472 U.S. at 611.
95 d. at 600.
9 i 738 F.2d at 1522 n. 16.
97 472 U.S. at 601: ,westra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
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emphasized that this free-trader right is limited to cases "in the ab-
sence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly." 99 In other words,
under the Colgate rule a firm may not refuse to cooperate when the
refusal is primarily aimed at monopolization. A monopolist's re-
fusal to participate in joint marketing could reflect such a monopo-
listic intent in certain circumstances, Justice Stevens stated, and
evidence of intent is thus relevant to whether challenged conduct is
"fairly characterized as exclusionary."' 100
After endorsing the trial court's instructions, Justice Stevens
reasoned that the jury (assuming that it followed those instructions)
must have distinguished "between practices which tend to exclude
or restrict competition on the one hand, and the success of a busi-
ness which reflects only a superior product, a well-run business, or
luck, on the other." 10 1 A valid business justification would have
placed Ski Co. in the "superior product" or "well-run business" cat-
egory. For the Court, then, the issue was whether the record sup-
ported the jury's conclusion that no valid business justifications
existed for Ski Co.'s refusal to cooperate.10 2
In addressing this question, Justice Stevens considered not only
Ski Co.'s proffered justifications, but also the effect of Ski Co.'s con-
duct on consumers and on Highlands to determine whether Ski Co.
was "attempting to exclude [Highlands] on some basis other than
efficiency."' 0 3 Justice Stevens noted that three circumstances sup-
ported the jury's conclusion that Ski Co. willfully maintained its mo-
nopoly power. First, because the evidence established the superior
quality of the all-Aspen ticket, Ski Co.'s termination of that ticket
adversely affected consumers. 10 4 Second, Ski Co.'s practices had an
adverse impact on Highlands's opportunity to compete, as evi-
denced by the extent of Highlands's pecuniary injury, its fruitless
attempts to protect itself from the cancelled arrangement, and the
steady decline of its share of the relevant market after Ski Co. termi-
nated the ticket. 10 5 Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Ski Co.
failed to present any legitimate business or efficiency justification for
its conduct concerning the joint ticket. 10 6
Justice Stevens noted in conclusion that although Ski Co.'s pat-
tern of conduct may not have been as "bold, relentless, and preda-
98 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
99 472 U.S. at 602 (emphasis in original).
100 Id.
101 Id. at 604.
102 Id. at 605.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 605-07; see infra notes 124-32 and accompanying text.
105 472 U.S. at 607-08; see infra notes 133-45 and accompanying text.
106 472 U.S. at 608-10; see iifra notes 147-54 and accompanying text.
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tory" as the newspaper's practices in Lorain Journal, the record
supported an inference that Ski Co. had intended to discourage ski-
ers from patronizing Highlands: 0 7 "Ski Co. was not motivated by
efficiency concerns and was willing to sacrifice short run benefits
and consumer good will in exchange for a perceived long run im-
pact on [Highlands]."'' 08 Finally, because the evidence adequately
supported the jury finding of willful maintenance under the trial
court's instructions, Justice Stevens found it unnecessary to address
the possible relevance of the "essential facilities" doctrine.' 09
IV
ANALYSIS
The Tenth Circuit in Aspen Skiing noted that " 'the instances in
which a monopolist has a duty to cooperate or deal is one of the
most 'unsettled and vexatious' issues in antitrust law.' "10 Aspen
Skiing thus presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to re-
solve a serious dilemma faced by monopolists: whether to cooper-
ate with competitors and risk a collusion suit under section 1 or
refuse to cooperate and hazard a monopolization suit under section
2. The Supreme Court failed, however, to resolve adequately this
dilemma. The Court's reliance on factors which do not meaning-
fully differentiate between exclusion and competition and its failure
to state clearly the circumstances under which a refusal to cooperate
constitutes monopolization creates uncertainty and may distort in-
centives to engage in efficient business activity.
Aspen Skiing reaffirms the Grinnell willful maintenance stan-
dard"' of inferring anticompetitive intent from proof of adverse ef-
fects on competitors and consumers. The monopolist can negate
this inference only by establishing a valid business justification for
its conduct. The Court noted that three circumstances supported
the inference that Ski Co. was unlawfully attempting to exclude
Highlands on some basis other than efficiency. After examining
these circumstances, however, it is difficult to determine precisely
how the Court distinguished between exclusionary conduct and ag-
gressive competition. Moreover, requiring cooperation among
competitors is especially problematic for two reasons. First, ajudi-
107 472 U.S. at 610. Ski Co. had contended in its brief that its conduct was clearly
different from that of the monopolist in Lorain Journal because Ski Co. was perfectly
willing to sell ski lift tickets to skiers who also patronized Highlands's facility. Brief of
Petitioner, supra note 93, at 29-30.
108 472 U.S. at 611.
lo Id. at 611 n.44.
I 1 738 F.2d at 1519 (quoting Byars v. Blufl'City News Co., 609 F.2d 843. 846 (6th
Cir. 1980)).
I See supra note 35 and accompanyiNg text.
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cially imposed arrangement demands judicial supervision, a task for
which courts are unsuited. Second, imposing terms is far more diffi-
cult in a horizontal context (competitors) than in a vertical context
(e.g., producer-distributor). Unlike the vertical context, where a
court could merely require a producer to deal with all distributors
on equal terms, no benchmark exists upon which to rely in fixing
terms among competitors. The Aspen Skiing Court apparently over-
looked these difficulties.
Dominant firms need to know the precise point at which their
aggressive competition becomes exclusionary conduct and there-
fore illegal."t 2 Unfortunately, Aspen Skiing sends out an uncertain
signal. To mitigate this uncertainty, courts should limit Aspen Skiing
to its narrow holding that a monopolist's decision to extricate itself
from a successful joint venture can give rise to section 2 liability
when the joint product or service is demonstrably more efficient
than its alternative, the monopolist lacks any legitimate business jus-
tification for its conduct, and barriers seriously hinder entry into the
relevant market.
A. The Aspen Skiing Test for Exclusionary Conduct
1. The Court Reaffirms Grinnell's Willful Maintenance Standard
In sustaining the trial judge's instructions to the jury on mo-
nopolization, the Supreme Court in Aspen Skiing reaffirmed the Grin-
nell willful maintenance standard for the conduct element of
monopolization. The Court's analysis o f challenged conduct by a
lawful monopolist (evaluating the effect on consumers and on com-
petitors and the monopolist's business justifications) refines the
Grinnell rule. In so doing, Aspen Skiing resists a recent trend in the
lower courts whose benign attitude toward monopolists signaled a
partial erosion of Grinnell. 13 Indeed, Aspen Skiing gave teeth to Grin-
nell's willful maintenance standard.
Citing Grinnell, the district court judge had defined the conduct
element of monopolization as "the willful acquisition, maintenance
or use of [monopoly] power by anticompetitive or exclusionary
means or for anticompetitive or exclusionary purposes."' ' 4 The
judge instructed the jury that, in considering whether Ski Co.'s
means or purposes were anticompetitive or exclusionary, it should
distinguish between practices that tended to restrict competition
and those that reflected only a superior product, a well run business
or luck. As such, a lawful monopolist's refusal to deal or cooperate
112 See supra notes I 1-14 and accompanying text.
1 See supra notes 36-46 and accompanying text.
114 472 U.S. at 595-96.
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with a competitor is not willful maintenance if valid business reasons
exist for that refusal.
The Supreme Court sustained the district court judge's instruc-
tions as consistent with Grinnell and then evaluated Ski Co.'s conduct
under the Grinnell standard. The Court suggested a three-prong test
to determine whether a lawful monopolist intentionally maintained
its power through exclusionary means or with exclusionary pur-
poses:' 15 first, whether the monopolist's conduct adversely affected
consumers; second, whether the monopolist's conduct hampered ri-
vals' ability to compete; and third, whether the monopolist's con-
duct is justified by valid business considerations.
2. The Court s Reliance on Intent Creates an Uncertain Standard
Aspen Skiing's three-prong test for exclusionary conduct reestab-
lishes intent as a relevant section 2 inquiry in analyzing challenged
monopolist conduct. A finding of adverse impact on consumers and
on rivals' ability to compete gives rise to a rebuttable presumption
of section 2 illegality. To rebut this presumption, the defendant
monopolist must establish that a legitimate business purpose justi-
fied its conduct; thus, proof of a valid business purpose negates the
inference of monopolistic intent.' I"
The reliance on intent under the Aspen Skiing test for illegal ex-
clusionary conduct creates undesirable uncertainty for lawful mo-
nopolists. In defining improper conduct, courts should concentrate
on conduct rather than motive, isolating those characteristics of
conduct that antitrust law seeks to prohibit.' 17 Although Aspen Ski-
ing does mention conduct, the discussion largely focuses on conduct
that gives rise to inferences of intent. In short, Aspen Skiing conclu-
sively infers wrongful motive from wrongful conduct. The result
would have been the same, the analysis more clear, and the signal to
dominant firms more intelligible had the Court spoken exclusively
of conduct. Discussion of intent is mostly diversionary or redun-
dant. All competitively aggressive firms "intend" to withstand com-
petition from rivals. The monopolist who introduces a superior
115 The Court endorsed the definition of exclusionary conduct as articulated by
Professors Areeda and Turner. Under this formulation, exclusionary conduct nicans. at
Most, behavior that (I) tends to impair the opportunities of rivals. and (2) either does
not firther competition or does so in an tunnecessarily restrictive way. See 3 P. ARl.\ &
D. TURNER. snpa note I, 4 6261), at 77-78.
I I The test suggested in .Lpeu Skiing is similar to the test applied by several lower
courts in refisal-to-deal cases under section 2. This test was first artictlated in Brars N.
BhtlI'Cit% News Co., 609 F.2d 843 (6th Cir. 1979). In BYm'as. the Sixth Circuit proposCd a
two-part test to evaluate reftsals-to-deal: first, whether the refisal is on balance
procompetitive or anticompetitive second, whether the refusal is justified by normal
business reasons. I. at 860-62: see .pra notes 65-68 and acconipanying text.
117 See sn/pa notes 6- 14 and accompanying text.
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product or service "intends" either to create new demand or to woo
customers away from his rival. Declaring this beneficial conduct ille-
gal under the heading of willful maintenance would in effect abolish
the conduct requirement and make mere monopoly power per se
illegal. Aside from perhaps the Second Circuit in Alcoa, no court has
"intended" to reach this result.I' Intent does not provide a mean-
ingful basis to distinguish between lawful and unlawful monopolist
conduct.
The question of intent can be relevant, however, in cases where
a monopolist's acts have an uncertain competitive effect. In such a
case, a limited inquiry into intent can channel judicial discretion. 91 9
As Justice Brandeis aptly stated, "[T]he purpose or end sought to be
attained [is a] relevant [fact] because knowledge of intent may help
the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences."' 120
B. The Court Failed to Articulate a Clear Standard
The Supreme Court in Aspen Skiing noted that three important
circumstances supported the jury verdict. The Court did not, how-
ever, indicate the minimum evidentiary requirements necessary for
a finding of a section 2 violation in future refusal-to-cooperate cases.
It did not draw a bright line between aggressive competition and
exclusion. The resulting uncertainty will exacerbate the monopo-
list's dilemma over how far it may go in competing with potential
and existing rivals.
The Court characterized Ski Co.'s decision to terminate the
joint marketing arrangement as a "decision by a monopolist to make
an important change in the character of the market."121 Ski Co. had
contended that neither the decision nor its implementation could
fairly be described as exclusionary. 122 Although the Court agreed
that such a decision is not necessarily exclusionary, 123 it noted that
three circumstances could support the jury's verdict: (1) the supe-
rior quality of the all-Aspen ticket; (2) the adverse impact on High-
lands's ability to compete; and (3) the absence of a legitimate
business justification. Upon examination of each circumstance,
however, it is difficult to determine precisely where the Court has
drawn the line between condemnable exclusionary conduct and
beneficial competition.
118 See 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, .Wlp)'a note 1, (1 626b, at 77-78.
119 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
120 Chicago Bd. of'lrade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (analyzing regu-
lation competitors adopted to govern their trading behavior).
121 472 U.S. at 604.
122 Id. at 604.
123 472 U.S. at 604.
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1. Adverse Effect on Consumers
The Court stated that the adverse impact on skiers resulting
from the termination of the all-Aspen ticket supported the jury's
verdict. Yet, a consumer impact standard for detecting exclusionary
conduct depends upon gauging benefits and detriments to consum-
ers, an inherently difficult task.
Aspen Skiing was an easy case. The six-day, all-Aspen ticket was
a voluntarily established pattern of marketing downhill skiing serv-
ices. The joint ticket, with revenues allocated according to actual
usage, first developed when three companies operated three differ-
ent ski mountains in the Aspen area. The multi-area ticket contin-
ued in use when Ski Co. opened up a fourth mountain. Moreover,
the record disclosed that other competitive multimountain ski re-
sorts offered skiers multiday interchangeable tickets, including some
in which Ski Co. participated.124 Because the four-mountain, all-
Aspen ticket arose in a competitive milieu, it was presumptively
more efficient than any of the posttermination arrangements.1 25
The joint ticket provided the skier convenience and flexibility by al-
lowing him to purchase a multiday ticket in advance while reserving
the opportunity to ski any of the Aspen mountains on any particular
day. Although Ski Co.'s three-area ticket featured some of the same
attributes,' 26 the evidence supported an inference that skiers were
"frustrated" over the unavailability of the four-area ticket.' 27
Consumer frustration, however, inaccurately indicates exclu-
sionary conduct. Under Aspen Skiing's peculiar facts, the monopo-
list's conduct unambiguously promoted consumer dissatisfaction.
Future cases, however, likely will not be as straightforward. For ex-
ample, firms occasionally "frustrate" consumers by discontinuing
some product or service, hoping to earn larger profits in other ways.
A television network may cancel a program in the hopes that its re-
placement will attract a larger audience, thus "frustrating" those
viewers who preferred the old program.
The Court believed that adverse effect on skiers supported an
inference of predation because Ski Co. was apparently willing to sac-
rifice consumer goodwill in exchange for a perceived long-run im-
124 Ski Co. participated in interchangeable ticket systems in at least two other ski
resorts. Id. at 603 n.30.
125 The Court stated that because the all-Aspen ticket "originated in a competitive
market and had persisted for several years" and because "interchangeable tickets are
used in other mutimountain areas which apparently are competitive, it seems appropri-
ate to infer that such tickets satisfy consumer demand in free competitive markets." Id.
at 603 (footnote omitted); see R. BORK, supra note 3, at 156 (predation may be inferred
from disruption of existing distribution patterns).
126 472 U.S. at 606.
127 Id. at 606-07 & 607 n.36.
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pact on Highlands.' 8 A predatory strategy, however, seeks to draw
consumers away from a competitor in the short run through lower
price or through product enhancement. 12'1 No predatory strategy
succeeds by frustrating consumers.
Some courts have employed a "beneficial impact on consum-
ers" standard. Under this standard if a monopolist's new service or
product increases quality or lowers price, the introduction of the
new service or product is presumptively procompetitive. For exam-
ple, the Second Circuit in Berkey Photo deemed Kodak's design
changes presumptively procompetitive because they gained "accept-
ance in the market."' 30 The court reasoned that, absent coercion, a
monopolist's innovation succeeded in~the marketplace because the
innovation had incorporated performance improvements and thus
should not be condemned. The flaw with this reasoning is that ac-
ceptance in the market may merely reflect the absence of viable
choice available to the consumer or an overwhelming familiarity
with the monopolist's product or service.' 3 ' Where the effects of
challenged conduct on consumers are uncertain, or cannot be at-
tributed conclusively to either exclusion or efficiency, courts should
conduct a limited inquiry into the monopolist's intent. 3 2
2. Adverse Impact on Rivals ' Ability to Compete
The Court also ruled that adverse impact on Highlands's ability
to compete supported the jury finding of exclusionary conduct. In
assessing the impact on Highlands the Court considered the extent
of Highlands's pecuniary injury, 133 its futile attempts to provide an
alternative to the joint ticket,' 34 and the steady decline in its market
share after Ski Co. cancelled the arrangement. 13 5 Ski Co.'s refusal
to cooperate prevented Highlands from offering its customers a
multi-area ski experience and had a direct, ruinous effect on High-
lands's ability to compete. Once again, future cases may not be as
straightforward. Because all competing firms aim to succeed, and
success usually comes at the expense of rivals, adverse impact on
128 Id. at 610-11.
129 See H. HOVNKAMP, spra note II. at §§ 6.8-.11; Easterbrook, Predaor Strategies
and Countersralegies, 48 U. Cm. L. RE\'. 263, 268-69 (1981).
130) "If a monopolist's products gain acceptance in the market, therefore. it is of no
importance that ajudge or jury may later regard them as inferior, so long as that success
was not based on any form of coercion." Berkey Photo, Inc. %. Eastman Kodak Co., 603
F.2d 263, 287 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1983).
131 Comment, stpra note 36, at 324.
132 See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
:133 The jury calculated Highlands's actual damages at $2.5 million. 472 U.S. at 595.
134 Id. at 593-94; see supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
135 472 U.S. at 595.
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rivals, standing alone, does not differentiate between aggressive
competition and exclusion.
The termination of an established marketing pattern, here the
all-Aspen ticket, may be used strategically to gain a competitive ad-
vantage. The all-Aspen ticket originated in a competitive market,
was voluntarily adopted by the operators of the three original ski
facilities in Aspen, and continued in operation for sixteen years.
Under Professor (now Judge) Bork's view, disturbing optimal pat-
terns of distribution13 6 can constitute exclusion, or more specifi-
cally, predation. 137 Bork opines, however, that this tactic would be
counterproductive when the "predator" will incur substantial added
costs. 138
The Court stated that Ski Co.'s termination of the joint ticket
was "predatory." 3 9 Predation, however, involves the practice of ac-
cepting short-term losses in order to reap future monopoly prof-
its. 4 1 Because Ski Co. had not suffered any short-term losses
following its termination of the joint ticket, its conduct was not tech-
nically predatory. Rather, Ski Co.'s pattern of conduct was more
likely a subtle form of exclusion recently described as "raising rivals'
costs." Although Ski Co.'s refusal to cooperate with Highlands was
"costly" to Ski Co., it was even more costly to Highlands. Because
Ski Co. could continue to offer its skiers a multislope experience
through its three-mountain package while Highlands could not, the
all-Aspen ticket was more valuable to Highlands than it was to Ski
Co. The immediate result of the termination of the joint ticket was
that Ski Co.'s relative market share grew, while that of Highlands
declined. 141
For a monopolist, raising rivals' costs has significant advantages
over predation as a means of exclusion. 142 This strategy, however,
1 3 Bork theorizes that, in every market, certain marketing patterns develop over
time. According to Bork, these established market patterns, which he calls "optimal
patterns," are presumably more efficient than those marketing patterns that do not de-
velop. R. BoRK, supra note 3, at 156.
137 I. By disturbing "optimal patterns" of marketing. a monopolist nmay impose
costs on its rival. If these imposed costs are significant the monopolist may employ the
disturbance as a means of predation. Predation, although frequently used synony-
miouslv with exclusion, technically means sacrificing losses today in return fbr a per-
ceived increase in future profits. See. e.g.. F. SCIHERER, supra note 5. at 273-78. Bork
avoids the conclusion that disturbance of established patterns should be per se illegal
for two reasons. First, the "predator" will incur added costs as well, limiting the sittta-
tions where it can use this tactic as a predatory tool. Second, Bork opines that such
conduct will potentially create efficiencies. R. BORK, supra note 3, at 156.
138 R. BORK, Supra7 note 3, at 156.
139 472 U.S. at 605-09.
140 See F. SCHIERER, supra note 5, at 273-78.
141 472 U.S. at 595.
142 First, whereas predation is successful only if the rival exits the market, raising a
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may inevitably cause higher market prices, higher market share for
the monopolist, more profits for the monopolist relative to his ri-
vals, and most important, lower output. An inquiry into the impact
on rivals' ability to compete, then, should consider whether a mo-
nopolist aims to raise his rivals' costs. If the strategy results in
higher prices or reduced output, courts should condemn it.
Adverse impact on competitors does not provide a meaningful
basis for distinguishing between competition and exclusion. The
objective of antitrust law is to protect the process of competition on
the merits, not to preserve the financial viability of all competi-
tors.' 43 Moreover, focusing on adverse impact on rivals obscures
the important distinction between practices that seek to exclude
competitors and those that reduce a rival's market share because of
the monopolist's superior product or business acumen.144 All com-
petitive firms intend to prevail over their existing or potential rivals;
and all successful competitive maneuvers tend to exclude. 145 An in-
quiry into effect on competitors as Aspen Skiing seems to require
should not divert attention from the ultimate question: whether the
alleged exclusionary practice increases or decreases output.
3. Business Justification
In concluding its analysis of Ski Co.'s challenged conduct the
Supreme Court stated that the absence of a legitimate business or
efficiency justification was perhaps the most "significant" factor sup-
porting the jury finding of exclusionary conduct. 146 The Court rea-
soned that a normal business or efficiency reason could offset an
inference of monopolistic intent. 147 The problem lies in determin-
ing what is a normal or legitimate business purpose.
The Court stated that the evidence did not support Ski Co.'s
two proffered business justifications: Ski Co.'s inability to monitor
rival's costs is effective even if the smaller rival does not exit the market because compet-
ing against a high-cost firm is preferable to competing against a low-cost firm. Second,
the predator must sacrifice short-run profits in exchange for speculative and indetermi-
nate long-run profits, but a cost-raiser may enjoy higher profits even in the short run. A
firm whose costs have risen either reduces output or raises prices, permitting the domi-
nant firm to raise its prices or increase its relevant market share. Third, although suc-
cessful predation requires that the predator have a "deep pocket" or easy access to
financing, raising rivals' costs may be relatively inexpensive for the firm engaging in this
strategy. See Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to
Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986); Salop & Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs.
73 Am. ECON. REv. 267 (1983).
143 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 1, 626b, at 77-78.
144 See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
145 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 1, 626b, at 77-78.
146 472 U.S. at 608-10.
147 Id. at 610 ("Thus the [absence of a normal business justification] supports an
inference that Ski Co. was not motivated by efficiency concerns .... ").
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usage accurately and its desire to disassociate itself from the alleg-
edly "inferior skiing services at Highlands." 48 Thus, the Court de-
termined that the jury could find that Ski Co.'s conduct lacked a
legitimate business or efficiency justification.
Attracting the customers of a competitor, however, is a normal
business purpose. The Court apparently ignored the need to allow
monopolists some discretion in making business decisions. 49 Ski
Co. terminated the joint marketing arrangement, a profitable busi-
ness venture, because it thought that it could increase revenues by
attracting those skiers whose dollars would otherwise go to High-
lands under the joint ticket. 150
Aspen Skiing arguably stands for the inflexible proposition that a
lawful monopolist's termination of any profitable business venture
with a smaller rival gives rise to antitrust liability. Moreover, as the
Ninth Circuit recently held, Aspen Skiing's reasoning would even
sanction a desire to increase short-term profits as a normal business
justification.- 5' The Aspen Skiing Court believed, however, that Ski
Co. aimed to economically injure Highlands more than pursue effi-
ciencies, in part because Ski Co. would have reaped increased ticket
revenues had it cooperated with Highlands after Ski Co. terminated
the joint ticket.152
The presence or absence of a legitimate business justification is
perhaps the most reliable factor in the Court's section 2 inquiry. A
legitimate business justification can offset an inference of anticom-
petitive intent' 53 resulting from evidence of an adverse impact on
rivals or consumers. More important, allowing a monopolist to
avoid section 2 liability by presenting a normal business justification
is consistent with the most important antitrust goal: 154 promoting
vigorous competition. Courts should not deny firms whose market
148 Id. at 608-09.
149 Cf Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 862 (6th Cir. 1979) (citing Sar-
gent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701, 711-13 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1979); International Rys. of Cent. Am. v. United Brands Co., 532
F.2d 231, 239-40 (2d Cir.), ceri. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976)).
150 472 U.S. at 592.
151 See Drinkwine v. Federated Publications, Inc., 780 F.2d 735, 740 (9th Cir. 1985)
(desire to make more money is proper motive consistent with Aspen Skiing), ceri. denied,
106 S. Ct. 1471 (1986).
152 472 U.S. at 610.
153 See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
154 The basic debate concerning the underlying policies of antitrust law is between
those who believe that allocative efficiency should be the exclusive goal and those who
urge that antitrust policy should consider certain competing values, including maximiza-
tion of consumer wealth, protection of small businesses, concern over concentrations of
economic wealth, and encouragement of morality in business practices. See H.
HOVENKAMP, supra note 11, § 2.1, at 41-42. For the best statement of the efficiency view,
see Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925 (1979). For a
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success places them in dominant positions the right to compete
through increased efficiency or superior products.
C. Lower Courts Should Narrowly Construe Aspen Skiing
Read broadly Aspen Skiing might suggest that a qualified duty
exists on all monopolists to cooperate with their smaller rivals. The
factual posture of Aspen Skiing, however, militates against such a
broad application of the decision. First, the defendant in Aspen Ski-
ing did not simply terminate the joint ski lift ticket; Ski Co. engaged
in a wide range of exclusionary practices 5 5 in its attempt to disasso-
ciate itself from the all-Aspen venture. These exclusionary practices
gave rise to a strong inference of anticompetitive intent and ef-
fect. 156 Second, the all-Aspen ticket was an efficient marketing tool;
its termination and substitution with unilaterally offered services
was inefficient. 157
Ski Co.'s exclusionary conduct went far beyond a refusal to en-
gage in joint marketing. The Court emphasized at the outset that
Ski Co. had not merely rejected a novel offer to participate in a co-
operative venture; rather, it had unilaterally terminated a financially
successful venture that had persisted for several years. 158 Ski Co.
had even refused to deal with Highlands on a seller-buyer basis, 59
thereby excluding Highlands from the multimountain ski services
market. Ski Co. also conducted an advertising campaign that con-
veyed the impression that Ski Co.'s three mountains were the only
ski facilities in Aspen. The Court concluded that the totality of Ski
Co.'s conduct supported an inference that Ski Co. was motivated,
not by efficiency or business concerns, but by a willingness to sacri-
statement supporting the view that antitrust policy should concern itself with competing
values, see Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051 (1979).
Some view Aspen Skiing as setting forth a compromise between those Supreme Court
Justices who supported the "efficiency" theory and those Justices who advocate inclu-
sion of "competing values." Malina, Suprenie Court Update-1985, 54 ANTITRUST LJ. 289,
295 (1985). Under this theory, the business justification could be seen as the price of
accepting intent analysis and the creation of a qualified duty to cooperate.
155 Ski Co.'s refusal to sell tickets in bulk to Highlands was a refusal-to-deal. Ski
Co.'s price reduction of its three-area tickets resembled predatory pricing, at least in a
nontechnical sense. Ski Co.'s price increase on its single-day tickets arguably was "rais-
ing rival's costs." Finally, the deceptive advertising campaign was what antitrust liti-
gants would call a "dirty trick."
156 472 U.S. at 610.
157 See supra notes 124-32 and accompanying text.
158 472 U.S. at 603.
15) See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text. Two of Ski Co.'s proffered busi-
ness justifications, that it could not properly monitor usage and that the surveys were
disruptive, even if believed, would not have explained its refusal to grant access. Ski
Co.'s reason for refusing to accept the vouchers-administrative inconvenience-was
quickly dismissed by the Court, as it appeared to have been a self-serving ex post facto
excuse. 472 U.S. at 609-10.
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fice short-term benefits and consumer goodwill in anticipation of a
long-term impact on Highlands. 160 Aspen Skiing imposed antitrust
liability upon a monopolist whose numerous injurious acts all lacked
legitimate business justifications. Thus, courts should limit Aspen
Skiing and impose antitrust liability only when a monopolist goes far
beyond a mere refusal to engage in joint marketing.
Courts should further limit any duty to cooperate to cases, such
as Aspen Skiing, where the cooperative venture is demonstrably effi-
cient, relative to its substitute. Specifically, a joint venture is more
efficient than its substitute when market demand or output under
the joint venture is greater than under its substitute. The opinion
states that most skiers in Aspen preferred a four-mountain pass over
a three-mountain pass. Thus, market demand was greater under the
all-Aspen arrangement than when each firm sold its ski passes sepa-
rately.' 61 In addition to its efficiency enhancing features, the joint
ticket did not produce the anticompetitive effects sometimes associ-
ated with a cooperative venture,' 62 such as price fixing or competi-
tion reduction.163
Finally, and perhaps most important, courts should further
limit the duty to cooperate as articulated in Aspen Skiing to instances
where barriers prohibit potential competitors from entering the
market or prevent existing rivals from increasing their output. 1 64
Because of practical considerations and regulatory obstacles, no
new major ski facilities could be developed in Aspen. Thus, the
threat of new competition could not thwart any attempt by Ski Co.
to charge monopoly prices.' 65 In Aspen, the market could not self-
correct.
160 472 U.S. at 610-11.
161 Id. at 605-07.
162 As a consequence of a prior consent decree, Ski Co. and Highlands had been
forbidden from fixing prices. Further, whereas joint ventures typically threaten to re-
duce the level of competition between the participating parties, mere joint marketing
like the all-Aspen ticket allows the parties to continue competing both in price and re-
lated services. See Brodley,Joint Ventures andAntitrst Policy, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1531
(1982).
163 One commentator opines that the all-Aspen ticket provided a forum for horizon-
tal price fixing and that Aspen Skiing carves out an exception to the rule that horizontal
price fixing is illegal per se. Cirace, An Economic Analysis of Antitrust Law's Natural Monop-
oly Cases, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 677 (1986). Cirace states that integration of pricing was
necessary for the natural monopoly (multimountain capacity) to be realized. This effi-
ciency aspect of "horizontal price fixing... outweighed its anticompetitive impact." Id.
at 726.
164 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
165 Arguably, the lower court may have mistakenly defined the relevant market too
narrowly. An alternative definition of the relevant geographic market would include
other destination ski resorts, in which case competition from these resorts would deter
Ski Co. from attempting to reap monopoly profits. See supra note 8 and accompanying
text.
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Aspen Skiing is an important, but limited, precedent. Aspen Skiing
does not stand for the proposition that once a monopolist extends a
helping hand to a competitor, withdrawing that assistance must give
rise to antitrust liability. 166 Nor does the case suggest that a monop-
olist's refusal to enter into a new joint venture with a competitor
where none existed before could never constitute monopolization.
Courts should therefore construe Aspen Skiing as setting forth a qual-
ified duty to cooperate with smaller rivals, limited to situations
where the defendant has engaged in exclusionary practices in addi-
tion to the refusal-to-cooperate, the joint product or service is more
efficient (results in higher output or demand) than its alternative,
and where barriers severely hinder entry into the relevant market.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Aspen Skiing ensured that the underlying
verdict in this case was not misinterpreted as creating a general duty
on monopolists to help their rivals survive in the market. In uphold-
ing the jury verdict of monopolization, however, the Court relied
upon factors-harm to competitors, "superiority" of the joint prod-
uct, and lack of a legitimate business purpose-that do not provide a
meaningful basis for distinguishing between aggressive competition
and exclusion.
The resulting uncertainty is exacerbated by the increased
weight the Court assigned to the jury's ability to infer anticompeti-
tive intent from conduct that could be explained either as aggressive
competition or exclusion. Aspen Skiing was an easy case; the defend-
ant had gone far beyond a mere refusal to cooperate. Its conduct
covered a wide range of exclusionary practices. Future cases will
not be so easy. Because all businesses seek to increase their market
share at the expense of their rivals, intent analysis is diversionary.
The possibility of understandable and workable differentiations be-
tween practices designed solely to exclude competition, and those
practices that, although they might harm competitors, actually pro-
mote efficiency and should be tolerated, is further discouraged
under an intent standard.
To avoid Aspen Skiing's slippery slope, courts should limit the
duty to cooperate to instances where cooperation already exists,
166 Presumably, a monopolist that extricates itself from a joint venture could incur
liability under contract theories of equitable or promissory estoppel or implied contract.
The same conduct could also give rise to tort liability by analogy to the common law tort
principle that although no affirmative duty exists to help a bystander in distress, once
offered it may not be withdrawn, at least where withdrawing diminishes the chance of
rescue by another bystander. Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
797 F.2d 370, 376 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1574 (1987) (citingJackson v.
City ofJoliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984)).
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where the joint product or service is demonstrably more efficient
than its alternative, and where barriers severely hinder entry into
the market. Without this limitation, the issue of when a monopolist
must cooperate with its smaller rival will remain "unsettled and vex-
atious."
Alon Y. Kapen
